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Considering that the Starmer government’s aim of a reset of Britain’s relations with the EU and its member states only shifted from a vague aspiration to actual government policy with its inclusion in the King’s Speech on 17 July, just when Brussels and other continental European countries were about to sink into the traditional August torpor, it can be said to have got off to a reasonable start. But there is clearly a long way to go; and the path will be strewn with plenty of obstacles and false trails.

The first steps taken at the NATO and the European Political Community summits were well calibrated. Clear enough to be an unmistakeable shift of policy from that of the preceding government, but not so detailed and precise as to provoke a flurry of legalistic throat-clearing. The priority given to a new Europe-wide security pact between the UK and the EU, whatever the outcome of the US presidential election on 5 November, over a range of other improvements to the post-Brexit trade and economic arrangements set out in the EU/UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 2019, was clearly well judged, given that the EU had already signed up to the idea of closer security cooperation when the post-Brexit deal was struck. It was only due to the short-sightedness of the Johnson government that this was jettisoned overboard at the start of the voyage. Everything that has happened since then, in particular Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, has confirmed that priority for the vast majority of European governments.  The most recent indication of this was the decision of the British and French governments to review and refresh the Lancaster House agreements.

How quickly can we expect progress to be made on both parts of that reset agenda? Not very quickly, is the honest answer. Why not? Because the subject matter is intrinsically complex and sensitive – we will after all be asking the EU to join us in fashioning a closer relationship with a third country than it has ever had before. Because, too, the EU’s institutions – the Commission, the Council and the Parliament – are still in transition following the European elections in June and will be in no shape to address these issues, along with other pressing priorities, until the end of the year. And because the outcome of the US presidential election will condition Europe’s handling of all these issues. Given that the Starmer government is, very wisely, avoiding its predecessor’s misguided and futile policy of playing divide and rule in national capitals while cold-shouldering the EU institutions, there is no alternative available to patience and perseverance. Time which should be spent in exploring with all players what changes are likely to be of mutual advantage to all concerned.

Because one clear guideline on the way ahead, on both security and the economic and trade issues, must be that any changes to the EU/UK relationship must be solidly based on the mutual benefit of the two parties. Otherwise we will just hear a lot about “cherry-picking” and that will lead to irritation rather than progress. Mutual benefit does not mean to say that every change  needs to be precisely  balanced in what Brussels tends to decry as “juste retour“. That could be hard to do on such matters as mobility partnerships, recognition of professional qualifications, Erasmus + and performing artists. But there does need to be an overall balance, as there was not in the deal struck by Johnson and Frost.

One issue that is certain to arise is what has become known in the jargon as “dynamic alignment”, which in ordinary speech means the two parties, the UK and the EU, agreeing that it is in their joint interest to apply the same regulatory arrangements. This will certainly come up when negotiations begin over a veterinary agreement – often known as SPS  (sanitary and phyto-sanitary arrangements). Up till now the failure to agree such arrangements has damaged both Britain’s and the EU’s agri-food exports with no compensating benefits to either side (and if you doubt that, just look at the trade figures). That should be easy to demonstrate and thus to counter the inevitable accusations of loss of sovereignty. In other cases – emission trading schemes, carbon border adjustments, steps to build a Europe-wide capital market – it could be sufficient to commit to avoiding obvious divergence between the two entities. Better surely to confront these delicate issues in an open and upfront way and not to address them by sleight of hand as was often the way chosen when the UK was a member of the EU?

No doubt there will be setbacks along this path. There always are, in European negotiations. But it should be possible to surmount them, particularly if the government continues at every level to re-build the trust so recklessly squandered in recent years. If one considers the gravity of the challenges which face all Europeans in the new and often daunting period we are living through, it should be axiomatic. And it should be possible to do so without seeking to overturn the decision taken in the 2016 referendum.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick is Chair of the European & International Analysts Group and a former UK Permanent Representation to the European Communities and the United Nations.